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ABSTRACT
The concept of Match-on-Card (MoC) consists of a smart
card which receives an applicant’s candidate template T to be
compared with the stored reference template Tref by process-
ing the complete matching algorithm during a biometric au-
thentication request. The smart card will then output whether
this comparison is positive or not. The main argument against
MoC-enabled smart cards is that it opens the way for YesCard
(i.e. an attack path previously seen in Banking, a card al-
ways returning ”yes”). The threat regarding Biometrics is not
only YesCard, but also NoCard as we will see in this paper.
We will propose a protocol to easily thwart these attacks by
using simple cryptographic primitives such as symmetric en-
cryption. This protocol will however only protect the system
from malicious smart cards, but will not protect the smart card
against malicious systems. Finally we will enhance this pro-
tocol to protect the smart card against its use as a so-called
oracle to guess the stored reference biometric template.
1. INTRODUCTION
The need for user authentication and user identification in In-
formation Technology (IT) world seems to date back to the
late sixties [1], and the idea to use fingerprints was already
there [2, 3]. More than thirty years later, the use of a personal
trait to be closely linked with our identification documents
(e.g. passports, visas, national ID cards) will invade our ev-
eryday life [4, 5].
To prove our identity, we can use three ways [1]:
1. Something we have (e.g. a Smart Card)
2. Something we know (e.g. a PIN code, a Password)
3. Something we are (Biometrics, e.g. Fingerprint, Face,
Iris)
In everyday life, we usually give our trust to a combi-
nation of something-we-have and something-we-know (e.g.
banking cards, SIM card in mobile phones) but a password
can be communicated or guessed and a personal device can be
lost or borrowed. Building a three-factor authentication with
the addition of one or several biometric techniques brings
high confidence in our authenticated interlocutor and provides
non-repudiation.
2. AUTHENTICATION FACTORS
2.1. Smart Card
A conventional smart card is a silicon electronic chip embed-
ded in a plastic rectangle printed with information concerning
the application or the issuer, as well as readable information
about the card holder (for instance, a validity date or a pho-
tograph). This support can also carry a magnetic stripe or a
bar-code.
While for the time being smart card microprocessor cores
are mainly 8 or 16-bit (the most common cores are Motorola’s
68HC05 and Intel’s 80C51), new 32-bit devices have recently
become available. From a functional standpoint a smart card
is a microcontroller, or let’s say a miniature computer. A
small on-board RAM serves as a temporary storage of cal-
culation results and the card’s microprocessor executes a pro-
gram etched into the card’s ROM at the mask-producing stage.
This program cannot be modified or read-back in any way.
For storing user-specific data individual to each card, cards
contain EEPROM (Electrically Erasable and Programmable
ROM) or flash memory, which can be written and erased hun-
dreds of thousands of times. Java cards even allow the loading
of executable programs (applets) into their nonvolatile mem-
ory according to the card holder’s needs.
The smart card chip contains a communication port for
exchanging data and control information with the external
world. This communication port may be a contact interface or
a contactless interface. The smart card chip is the ideal con-
tainer for cryptographic secrets such as symmetric secret keys
and asymmetric private keys. The use of contactless smart
card chip is now mandatory in numbers of travel documents
[6] and national ID programs. Here, the role of the electronic
chip is to authenticate the document (something-we-have) us-
ing cryptographic tools [7].
2.2. Password
A password is certainly the oldest and best known solution to
provide user authentication. However this sounds simple to
use, we have to take care about how the password is commu-
nicated: a secure channel between the authenticator (the sys-
tem or person controlling the authentication) and the applicant
(the candidate user) must be available, notably at the primary
exchange to set up the shared password. If these minimal pre-
cautions aren’t taken, very simple man-in-the-middle attacks
such as eavesdropping are possible. One of the most used
password-based authentication is the PIN (Personal Identifi-
cation Number) code authorizing the use of a banking card.
In this case, precautions must be taken when entering the PIN
code since this is very easy to spy over the shoulder of the
user (attack known as “shoulder-surfing”).
To ensure security in IT systems, the password is never
stored nor in clear text, nor only encrypted (reversible func-
tion) but only a cryptographic hash (short signature built with
a one-way function) of the password is kept is the system’s
memory. During the authentication, the candidate password
is hashed and the hash value is compared with the hash value
stored in the system (i.e. the hash value of the reference pass-
word). We will see later that this approach of passwords se-
curity is not usable with Biometrics, that need clear data for
the comparison process, hence decreasing the security level.
2.3. Biometrics
The biometric authentication [8] has the advantage of check-
ing the user’s personal characteristics. These characteristics
can be physical ones such as fingerprints, face, iris or behav-
ioral ones such as voice, handwritten signature, keyboard tap-
ping.
This brings to a possible split in the usually called
something-we-are:
1. Something we are (physical Biometrics)
2. Something we know how to do (behavioral Biometrics)
Behavioral characteristics are much less stable than physical
characteristics because of their poor resistance to user’s stress
or health troubles. The authentication process is a compar-
ison between a pre-registered reference image, or template
(representative data extracted from the raw image, built dur-
ing an enrolment step) and a newly captured candidate image,
or template. Depending on the correlation between these two
samples, the algorithm will determine if the applicant is ac-
cepted or rejected. This statistical process leads to a False
Acceptance Rate (FAR, i.e. the probability to accept a non-
authorized user) and a False Rejection Rate (FRR, i.e. the
probability to reject an authorized user).
3. SECURITY ISSUES
3.1. Biometrics and Smart Card
The use of Biometrics without any personal device to store
the reference template leads to privacy concerns: the central-
ized database which stores all biometric information from ev-
ery user could be hacked. The use of a smart card here al-
lows building up a distributed database where every user is
the carrier of his own biometric reference, hence downsizing
the previous privacy concern. Depending on the application,
the smart card could handle differently the biometric data:
1. Storage-on-Card (SoC): the reference biometric tem-
plate is stored on the smart card and is read by the sys-
tem at any authentication request. This only uses non-
volatile memory, hence allowing cost-effective smart
card. However the reference template is exposed to
different attacks when communicated out of the smart
card.
2. Match-on-Card (MoC): the reference biometric template
will never be communicated out of the smart card once
written during the enrolment step. The candidate tem-
plate is sent to the smart card and the comparison is
processed internally. This protects the reference bio-
metric template but needs a more powerful smart card
in terms of processor and memory resources. This is
particularly interesting when the result of the authen-
tication has only to be used locally: applet activation,
access to private key for digital signature. A malicious
terminal capturing a candidate template will never have
the information in return if it matches or not.
3. Partial Match-on-Card (PMoC): this solution has the
advantages of both previous solutions, permitting cost-
effective smart card and protecting the biometric infor-
mation. The biometric information is split in two on the
smart card: a public part to be read by the terminal and
a private part which will be locked on the smart card
[9]. The process is like a biometric challenge-response:
the terminal reads the public part of the biometric infor-
mation, process complex computation and send a can-
didate to the smart card to be compared with the pri-
vate part of the biometric information using very light
computation on the smart card’s chip. Processing and
decision entities are clearly separated.
The combination of Biometrics and smart card is an old
topic [10] but the idea of using Biometrics to replace the PIN
code for security reasons is too often cited. Biometrics capa-
bilities are always overestimated. First of all, any biometric
data is not a secret: a face can be seen on any picture or video
recording even without the owner’s authorization, fingerprints
are left everywhere, voice can be recorded. Let’s say Biomet-
rics are public data, hence a biometric data can be captured
and replayed[11, 12].
Different attacks and countermeasures are possible de-
pending on the context of use of Biometrics and smart card.
We define here three contexts of use:
1. Attended Terminal : the applicant is in front of the au-
thority (e.g. face to face with a policeman)
2. Trusted Third-Party: under video surveillance (e.g. ATM,
banks, shops)
3. Uncontrolled Area: user at home with the smart card
and biometric device (e.g. e-voting, e-commerce)
For instance, only the last context of use would permit a ma-
nipulation of the biometric reader to bypass the captured im-
age and replay a matching candidate; idem for using a large
man-in-the-middle device.
Only the first context of use will prevent from the discrete
usage of a fingerprint copy or bad-looking smart card copy;
idem for using a discrete man-in-the-middle device. Classical
attack paths are:
1. Man-in-the-middle (capture and replay)
2. Finger substitution (gummy fingers)
3. Smart card substitution (forged cards, yes-cards)
4. Fingerprint and smart card readers manipulation
(probing)
Most of these attacks, finger substitution apart, can be stopped
by using cryptographic tools (e.g. mutual authentication, ses-
sion key). The countermeasures against finger substitution are
liveness detection systems built in the biometric reader itself
(e.g. pulse detection, skin conductivity).
A miscellaneous of threats and countermeasures can be
found in the following tables:
Context of use Threats
Attended terminal False cards, YesCards
Trusted third-party same as above + false finger
Uncontrolled Area same as above + Reader manipulation
Context of use Countermeasures
Attended terminal Secure printing, signed data
Trusted third-party signed data, liveness detection
Uncontrolled Area signed data, liveness detection,
tamper resistance
3.2. Biometrics and Password
First of all, the security of a password-based authentication
tool such as ones in Unix or Windows systems are based on
the local storage of only cryptographic hashes of passwords,
no passwords themselves. This is possible because of the de-
terministic nature of password authentication: if the entered
candidate password is the right one then its hash value equals
the stored hash value and the authentication succeeds; if the
entered candidate password is a wrong one then its hash value
is different and the authentication fails [13].
This previous approach of security is impossible with bio-
metric data. Any new capture of a biometric candidate results
in slightly different data which leads to the statistical nature
of Biometrics-based authentication (distance evaluation be-
tween two samples) [8]. The hash value of a reference bio-
metric template will be totaly different from the hash value
of any matching candidate, this means that biometric refer-
ences have to be store locally, in clear text or maybe encrypted
but encryption is a reversible function unlike a hash function
which is a one-way function. For more information on en-
cryption functions and hash functions see [14].
A deep characteristics analysis of both passwords and Bio-
metrics shows a clear opposition. This opposition confirms
the good complementarity of passwords and Biometrics. The
replacement of one with the other should be carefully studied
depending on the targeted application.
Previous things being said, we now need to counterbal-
ance with situations where Biometrics are in any case more
secure than passwords: weak passwords, bad-managed pass-
words, password-based authentication deactivated by the user.
Many Information System administrators complain about users
writing their password on a Post-It R© note stuck under their
keyboard or even on their computer’s screen. Many mobile
phone users leave the default PIN code (e.g. 0000, 1234) to
unlock the phone or even deactivate this security feature con-
sidered as counter user convenient. Too many passwords, to
be memorized, are short and explicit hence could be easily
guessed with a simple dictionary attack [15] or more sophis-
ticated attacks [16].
Thus, in most cases involving non security-aware users in
an environment requesting a minimum of security, the use of
Biometrics will anyway provide a “weak, but easy” security
tool.
3.3. Three-Factor Authentication
Any combination of two among three authentication factors
will miss at least one of the different security criteria. Something-
we-know with something-we-are will miss privacy since no
personal device implies the use of a database to centralized
all biometric data. Something-we-have with something-we-
are will miss a secret in the architecture since Biometrics
are public data. Something-we-have with something-we-know
will miss real user authentication since there is no proof of
link between the user and his card/PIN code.
Three-factor authentication provides the highest security
level in IT. Without being paranoid, some applications need
to duplicate one factor in the authentication scheme: some-
times we need to show both ID card and Passport, we need
to present both face and fingerprints, we need to enter the
password to log in a system and then enter another password
for the application we intend to use. For instance, the use
of smart card, PIN code, fingerprints and facial recognition
remains a three-factor authentication and not a four-factor au-
thentication as we can sometimes read in press releases and
marketing messages.
In today’s digital world, most of communication channels
are insecure since the first goal was to provide user conve-
nience. When delivering a password or a biometric data, a
particular attention must be paid to this communication chan-
nel to avoid very simple way to bypass authentication in the
system. The use of cryptographic tools is mandatory to ensure
the security of any three-factor authentication, the ultimate
solution being to combine three-factor authentication with a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). Nevertheless PKI being hard
and costly to set up, manage and maintain, more simple solu-
tions to provide secure communications over insecure chan-
nels [17] and to provide confidentiality and integrity of data
[14] must be considered.
4. THE YESCARD / NOCARD ISSUE
The YesCard is a smart card which has been maliciously mod-
ified to always answer with a positive authentication, what-
ever is the biometric data it receives. This helps an attacker
to enter in the system by presenting his own fingerprint and
the biased smart card. This attack was popular few years ago
in the banking area, exploiting a security flaw in ATM during
off-line transaction.
Conversely, the NoCard is a smart card which has been
maliciously modified to always answer with a negative au-
thentication, whatever is the biometric data it receives. This
provides denial of service for an authorized person to whom
an attacker has replaced the card and then get some benefits
from this situation (afterward, the attacker could impersonate
the authorized user with a YesCard to enter in the system).
The Match-On-Card feature has the unique advantage of
protecting the reference template of the user against capture
Smart Card System
capture finger,
extract T ,
check T
send {T,c}←−−−−−−−−− pick random c
if positive: r = Ek(c)
send r−−−−−−−−−→ check r
(if negative: r = c)
Fig. 1. Protocol #1
and replay attacks by storing this reference template in a ”safe”.
Once written at the enrolment, the smart card will never out-
put this reference, only the candidate will be sent to the smart
card to be internally compared with the reference. However,
since the smart card takes the decision, the MoC feature opens
the path for YesCard and NoCard. This widely used argument
against Match-on-Card can be easily thwarted by the protocol
described hereafter.
Firstly, we assume the use of a secure block cipher E (e.g.
AES, 3DES) and a cryptographic key k shared between gen-
uine smart cards and the system. The first idea was to use
a challenge-response protocol to output the decision of the
smart card: a/ if positive verification of candidate template T ,
the smart card send r = Ek(c) (the response) where c (the
challenge) is a random value given by the system together
with the candidate template T b/ if negative, the smart card
send any value different from r (c for instance). See Figure 1.
However this only protects from the Yescard. Then we
replace c by c‖b, denoting the concatenation of c with a bit b
where b = 0 if negative authentication or b = 1 if positive
authentication. The smart card will then send r = Ek(c‖b).
See Figure 2.
Smart Card System
capture finger,
extract T ,
check T
send {T,c}←−−−−−−−−− pick random c
r = Ek(c‖{0 or 1})
send r−−−−−−−−−→ check r
Fig. 2. Protocol #2
This protocol obviously protects from a non-authorized
smart card to be a Yes-or-No Card.
5. THE ORACLE ISSUE
An oracle is a device or an algorithm to which we can submit
questions and get answers, the oracle model is a powerful tool
to evaluate the security of a system by estimating the average
number of necessary queries to guess the content of the ora-
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Fig. 3. Smart Card as an oracle
cle. Of course, a smart card could be used as an oracle by a
malicious system to guess a matching candidate T (see Figure
3).
We can thus enhance our protocol to resist it (even if a
practical countermeasure could be the use of a try-counter of
non-matching candidate T to turn off the card). The Proto-
col #2 does not protect against a malicious system which will
send different T with always the same challenge c and ana-
lyze differences in answers (a practical countermeasure could
be the comparison of the challenge received with a log table
of previously used c to turn off the card). Moreover, classical
side-channel attacks against smart cards could be used to find
the value of the concatenated bit (which represents the deci-
sion) by carefully looking at the microprocessor operations
(e.g. power consumption or processing time will differ be-
tween computation with ‖0 or ‖1), all other bits being known
since the challenge c is transmitted in clear.
A simple way to protect the smart card against unautho-
rized system is to encrypt the couple {T, c} under the shared
key k. This also protects against side-channel attacks to re-
trieve the concatenated bit since all the other bits of the chal-
lenge c are no longer known. See Figure 4.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduce the notion of NoCard, being as
problematic as YesCard in the Biometrics domain and pro-
pose a protocol (Figure 4) that thwarts both attacks in a unique
simple way. Moreover this protocol prevents the smart card
from being used as an oracle by an unauthorized system to
guess its biometric content.
Smart Card System
capture finger,
extract T ,
check T
send {T,c}k←−−−−−−−−− pick random c
if positive: r = Ek(c‖1)
send r−−−−−−−−−→ check r
if negative: r = Ek(c‖0)
Fig. 4. Protocol #3
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